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Introduction 
 
It has recently been argued, by David Konstan, that sexual jealousy did not exist in Classical 
Greece – his argument being based partly on the lack of Greek terminology for this emotion, 
and partly on a supposed absence of certain aspects of modern sexual jealousy (primarily, 
affection).1 That sexual jealousy is not a universal emotion has been argued by some 
psychologists too.2 For instance, Ralph Hupka believes that sexual jealousy is more properly 
a type of anger, distinguished by the situations in which it occurs, these situations being 
culturally determined; thus when societies do not value romantic or monogamous 
attachments, and when the group is more important than the family or known paternity, 
sexual jealousy is not observed.3 However, other scholars disagree, arguing that an emotion 
may not be commonly observed in a society simply because that society lacks a convenient 
label for it; it does not necessarily follow that similar psychological and behavioural traits 
cannot be observed.4 
 
In this chapter, I use recent psychological research to demonstrate that sexual jealousy did 
exist in Classical Greece, and that there are, in fact, striking affinities between the ancient 
Greek and modern variants of this emotion. While we cannot, of course, simply transfer our 
own emotional concepts to Greek culture, there is a considerable extent to which sexual 
jealousy experience is cross-cultural, and in ancient Greece closely tied to erôs. To 
demonstrate this connection – and the efficacy of the methodological approach – most 
effectively, I have chosen to explore it through a close reading of a play in which Classicists 
usually deny the presence of the emotion: Euripides’ Medea. 
 
This tragedy’s plot involves a woman, abandoned by her husband for another woman, who 
revenges herself by killing her rival, the latter’s father (who arranged the match), and her own 
children by her ex-husband. To laypersons this would seem a straightforward tale of sexual 
jealousy, and a few scholars agree it is an important part of the plot.5 However, this is a 
minority view. The major current school of thought sees Medea as a Sophoclean, or even epic 
hero: she is driven by heroic pride.6 Others see her as acting from a terrible wrath, that (in 
Konstan’s words) has nothing of ‘petty jealousy’ in it.7 I do not intend to argue against pride 
or wrath as motivations. Medea is clearly enraged – anger words abound in the play; and 
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1 Konstan (2006) 219-43. 
2 There has been a lively debate for some decades over the universality or cultural specificity of emotions in 
general, a debate whose principal strands are summarized by Konstan (2006) 7-27; see also D.L. Cairns (2008). 
Among non-Classical scholarship, P.E. Griffiths (1997) and Reddy (2001) 3-62 provide useful summaries and 
critiques. See also the bibliography mentioned in Sanders and Thumiger (this volume) n. 9. 
3 Hupka (1991) and (1981); see also Sharpsteen (1991) 34 and Salovey (1991) 280. 
4 Elster (1999) 412; Kristjánsson (2002) 21. 
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6 Easterling (1977a) 178; Knox (1977) 196, 207; Gabriel (1992) 353; Mastronarde (2002) 8-9; Goldhill (2003) 
166-7; Holland (2003) 270. 
7 Konstan (2006) 57-9; Mastronarde (2002) 17-18; Goldhill (2003) 166-7; Harris (2003) 140-1. See Allen 
(2003) 90 on the connection between orgê and erôs, a connection denied by Harris (2003) 122. 
arguments for her heroic pride can point to repeated claims that she has been dishonoured, a 
repeated insistence that she cannot allow her enemies to laugh at her, and her clearly 
articulated choice to allow her passion to overrule her reason.8 However, people can respond 
to situations with more than one emotion. Euripides depicts his Medea as an immensely 
complex character, and I believe that reducing her emotional state to a monolithic pride or 
anger is too simplistic. Using the insights of modern psychology into prototypical jealousy 
episodes, I wish to rehabilitate sexual jealousy as a significant element in her motivation. I 
shall begin by outlining the modern theoretical scholarship on which I draw, before turning to 
the words and actions of Medea herself and others in the play. Finally, I shall look at the 
Greek vocabulary of jealousy, assisted by Aristotle. 
 
Psychological approaches to sexual jealousy 
 
Psychologists have noted that it often makes more sense to speak of an emotional episode or 
scenario, than an emotion per se.9 Emotional episodes begin with cognitions – perceptions of, 
or thoughts about, a situation – and our interpretations of them, frequently called the 
‘antecedent conditions’.10 These arouse psychological and physiological feelings, the 
‘emotion’ itself. Attempts at self-regulation may follow; then verbal expressions and/or 
physical actions resulting from the emotion; and eventually resolution.11 
 
Sexual jealousy, according to psychologists such as Gerrod Parrott or Jerome Neu, has three 
antecedent perceptions: (1) I have an exclusive relationship with someone; (2) I am in danger 
of losing that exclusivity or the entire relationship; (3) because I have a rival for his/her 
affection.12 Jealousy is an unusual emotion in that it necessarily involves three people.13 It is 
predicated on personal rivalry and fear of loss. It involves a unique, exclusive and 
affectionate bond with a unique individual, and a rupture of that exclusivity through imagined 
or actual alienation of the partner’s affection.14 Parrott argues that the partner becomes 
formative to our own self-conception, and this is what makes jealousy possible: what we fear 
to lose is not so much the beloved partner, as a part of ourselves.15 
 
The psychological feeling of jealousy is complex, and is generally considered a blend of 
simpler affects. These usually include anger, covetousness or envy, fear of (or grief at) loss, a 
blow to one’s self-esteem or pride, and hatred of the rival.16 Love is rarely included; possibly 
                                                 
8 Eur. Med. 1078-80: καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, 
ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς. 
9 E.g. Parrott (1991) 4: ‘an emotional episode is the story of an emotional event, and it seems a natural unit of 
analysis for understanding human emotions’. 
10 E.g. Sharpsteen (1991) 37 defines antecedent conditions as ‘the elements physically or objectively present in a 
situation, along with the perceptions, interpretations, and appraisals of them’. 
11 See also Elster (1999) 244-83 and Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 49-78, whose analyses differ in some details. 
12 Parrott (1991) 15-16; Neu (1980) 432-3; see Wierzbicka (1999) 99 for a slightly different formulation. These 
perceptions are generally phrased so as to encompass possessive as well as sexual jealousy, and Ben-Ze’ev 
(2000) 289-90 and Parrott (1991) 15-16 explicitly see sexual jealousy as the prototypical jealousy scenario; see 
Salovey and Rodin (1986) and Kristjánsson (2002) 155 ff. for contrary views. 
13 Klein (1957/1975) 181; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289-90; Kristjánsson (2002) 139-40. 
14 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 289-90; Parrott (1991) 15-16. 
15 Parrott (1991) 16-17; cf. Tov-Ruach (1980) 466-8. 
16 For various formulations see: Freud (1922) 223; Shengold (1994) 619; Spielman (1971) 78-9; Sharpsteen 
(1991) 31, 36; Planalp (1999) 174; Parrott (1991) 4; Neu (1980) 433; Kristjánsson (2002) 141-4, (2006) 17-8; 
Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 301. 
it is taken for granted, but perhaps it is simply not necessary: what matters is not that I love 
the person, but that (s)he is mine.17 
 
Jealousy is considered socially disruptive, even taboo, and therefore tends to be ‘veiled’ or 
‘masked’. Jon Elster says that the difference between a ‘veil’ and a ‘mask’ is ‘between hiding 
an emotion one feels and showing an emotion one does not feel’, though ‘a mask can also 
serve as a veil’.18 Elster calls this process either ‘misrepresentation’, which hides an emotion 
from others, or ‘transmutation’, which hides it from oneself as well.19 This is enormously 
important to a scholarly exploration of jealousy, because it requires the speech and behaviour 
of a jealous person to be examined well beyond the surface level. Observers do this 
subconsciously, through a cultural internalization of the jealousy prototype. However Parrott 
notes that, while an outside person would perceive jealousy, the patient themselves will most 
likely experience, or believe they are experiencing, anxious insecurity before the partner 
leaves them, or indignant anger afterwards.20 This may lead to revenge against either the 
partner (if love turns to hatred) or the rival (especially if there is a strong admixture of envy). 
In the absence of such closure, a natural path would be a period of recrimination, followed by 
some measure of acceptance.21 
 
Euripides’ Medea: situational antecedents and consequent actions 
 
The Nurse informs us in the prologue that Medea lived with Jason as her husband, bearing 
everything with him jointly (11-13)22 – an unusually close, and equal, partnership in the 
Greek world.23 But Jason has left Medea and married (18-19: γάμοις ... εὐνάζεται, γήμας) 
Creon’s daughter, Glauce.24 By line 19 we know we have an abandoned woman, her ex-
partner, and a rival. 
 
The Nurse tells us too about the strength of their relationship: from the first moment Medea 
met Jason, her heart was struck with erôs for him (8: ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ’). The Chorus 
too is well aware of the strength, and violence, of Medea’s passion for Jason. From the time 
she fled Iolkos with him, she had mad passion in her heart (433: μαινομένᾳ κραδίᾳ). 
Following her first confrontation with Jason, they talk of erôs that comes too excessively 
(627-8: ἔρωτες ὑπὲρ μὲν ἄγαν ἐλθόντες) and sing not one, but two hymns to the power of 
Aphrodite (627-42, 824-45).25 Jason too asserts that Medea feels erôs for him (530: ὡς Ἔρως 
σ’ ἠνάγκασε), though Medea herself only speaks of it in the abstract (330: βροτοῖς ἔρωτες ὡς 
κακὸν μέγα). 
                                                 
17 Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) 15-19 discuss the conflict between love and jealousy: love is theoretically 
unconditional and about the individuality and unconditional acceptance of the other, while jealousy is about my 
sexual desires, my loss, my humiliation, my aggression; however, love seems almost inherently to contain the 
capacity to be overpowered by jealousy when sexual desire is frustrated. 
18 Elster (1999) 96-7. This masking effect is more commonly recognized for envy – see n. 56 below. 
19 Elster (1999) 341-402 for a detailed discussion of transmutation and misrepresentation (of all emotions). 
20 Parrott (1991) 5-6, who states: ‘It is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or jealous person is the 
last person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions’ (6). 
21 Hupka (1991) 255-6; Sharpsteen (1991) 43-5. 
22 All line numbers refer to Eur. Med. unless otherwise stated. 
23 Page (1938/2001) believes equality would require the prefix be homo- rather than xum-. Mastronarde (2002) 
165 comments that this leaves some ambiguity as to whether she is equal or subordinate to Jason, but elsewhere 
(9, 167-8) states that their partnership is one of equals. 
24 Jason’s new wife is not named in the play, but for convenience I adopt the name most usually given her. Page 
(1938/2001) xxv n. 4 and E.E. Griffiths (2006) 8 note the alternative name Creousa. 
25 Mastronarde (2002) 16. 
We are never explicitly told that Jason felt erôs for her in return.26 However we do know that 
their relationship had a strong sexual element, and this is made clear by the extraordinary 
frequency of Greek words for the bed: lechos, lektron, eunê, or koitê occur twenty times as a 
euphemism for their old relationship, and twelve for his new one.27 Indeed Medea has the 
highest number of bed words (at thirty-six) of any extant tragedy.28 In Greek ‘the bed’ can be 
a euphemism for sex (and again Medea has by far the highest number with this meaning),29 or 
marriage. The bed motif is first introduced by the Nurse and Tutor in the prologue, and the 
Chorus in the parodos, where it appears several times referring to Jason’s new marriage 
(18: ἐυνάζεται, 88: εὐνῆς, 140: λέκτρα, 156: λέχη).30 Medea is at this point said merely to 
have erôs for the bed of death (151-2: τᾶς ἀπλάτου κοίτας ἔρος), since Jason has betrayed 
their marriage (207: ἐν λέχει προδόταν). The bed is here placed at the centre of their 
marriage,31 and it is the bed as concrete symbol (rather than e.g. the abstract γάμος) that Jason 
betrays. 
 
However, the bed is not just a metonym for their marriage, but also for what is performed on 
it – i.e. sex.32 Medea first draws attention to this herself, when she talks about going into the 
palace to kill Jason and his new bride as they lie on their bed (380: ἵν’ ἔστρωται λέχος). The 
Chorus says Medea has lost her marriage since her bed is manless (435-6: τᾶς ἀνάνδρου 
κοίτας ὀλέσασα λέκτρον), and another queen now rules over her marriage-bed (443: τῶν τε 
λέκτρων ἄλλα βασίλεια κρείσσων δόμοισιν ἐπέστα) – both comments having strong sexual 
overtones. 
 
In the agôn Medea complains Jason has made a new marriage (489: καινὰ δ’ ἐκτήσω λέχη): if 
she had been barren, then she could understand him feeling erôs for someone else’s bed 
(491: τοῦδ’ ἐρασθῆναι λέχους); as things are, he has betrayed the oaths they swore.33 In 
response, Jason draws attention to her erôs, saying it would be invidious to point out that 
Medea is besotted with him (529-30: ἐπίφθονος λόγος διελθεῖν ὡς Ἔρως σ’ ἠνάγκασε), doing 
                                                 
26 Medea says she knows Jason now feels erôs elsewhere (491), though to Aigeus (698, perhaps dissembling to 
avoid showing her true feelings) she says his erôs is for political advancement, not for her rival Glauce. The 
only other time the word is used is of Aigeus’ desire for children (714). 
27 Medea and Jason’s relationship (lechos 41, 207, 555, 568, 571, 591, 641, 697, 999, 1338, 1354; lektron 286, 
436, 443, 639; eunê 265, 570, 640, 1338; koitê 436); Jason and Glauce’s (lechos 156, 380, 489, 491, 887, 1367; 
lektron 140, 594, 1348; eunê 18, 88, 1027); here and in nn. 28, 29 I exclude cognates that always mean 
spouse/bed-sharer – e.g. xuneunetês, akoitis). Bed words particularly abound during Medea’s first and final 
scenes with Jason (446-626, 1317-1414). 
28 Large numbers of bed words also occur in several other Euripides plays: 33 in Helen, 28 in Andromache, and 
23 in Hippolytus. Aeschylus’ highest is 17 in Agamemnon, and Sophocles’ is 19 in Trachiniae. All these plays’ 
plots involve rivals for a legitimate spouse. 
29 Greek bed words (lechos, lektron, eunê, and koitê) are always potentially euphemisms for sex – though they 
can also mean bed, bedding, sleep, death, marriage or spouse. E.g. in Hom. Od. 23 (concerning Odysseus’ 
marriage with Penelope, centred round a physical bed) bed words are used 21 times, 15 meaning bed/bedding 
(ten lech-/lektr-, five eun-), three meaning sex (219, 254, 346; two eun-, one lektr-), and three implying both 
(257, 294, 354; two eun-, one lech-); in Od. 10 (concerning Odysseus’ sexual relationship with Circe) there are 
ten bed words, two meaning bed (both lech-), and eight meaning sex (all eun-). This suggests that eun-, at least 
in origin, has a stronger implication of sex than lech-/lektr-; we should also note that the latter roots only give us 
an object (lechos, lektron), while the former gives us both an object (eunê) and an activity (eunazô). 
30 Medea’s bed is also referred to in the Nurse’s opening speech (41: λέχος), but this line is almost certainly an 
interpolation, copied from 380 – see Page (1938/2001) 68. 
31 Cf. D.L. Cairns (2008) 54-5. 
32 Burnett (1998) 194-5 denies that the stress on Medea’s bed has anything to do with her sexual pleasure, but a 
focus on pleasure misses the point: for Medea, sex with her husband is both an end in itself, and also a sign of 
the continuing health of her marriage, in which is bound up everything she holds dear (see below). 
33 Presumably marriage oaths. Easterling (1977a) 180-1, Allan (2002) 50-1 for the argument that Jason and 
Medea were legitimately married, despite her being a barbarian, and the Corinthian Women agree (267, 578). 
it anyway. Jason constantly alludes to the sexual use of the marriage-bed: he says he did not 
leave her because he hated having sex with her, nor through longing for a new bride (555-
6: οὐχ ... σὸν μὲν ἐχθαίρων λέχος, καινῆς δὲ νύμφης ἱμέρῳ πεπληγμένος). Himeros means 
sexual desire, and its juxtaposition to lechos indicates we should read the latter as sex, not 
bed or marriage; numphê also draws attention to Medea and Glauce’s relative ages, a reason 
for Glauce’s greater sexual attractiveness. Jason argues that it is Medea who is chafed by 
matters sexual: ‘Honestly’, he says, ‘all you women care about is sex. If sex is going well, 
you think you have everything; if there’s a problem with your sex life, even the finest things 
are totally wrong.’ (568-73: οὐδ’ ἂν σὺ φαίης, εἴ σε μὴ κνίζοι λέχος. ἀλλ’ ἐς τοσοῦτον ἥκεθ’ 
ὥστ’ ὀρθουμένης εὐνῆς γυναῖκες πάντ’ ἔχειν νομίζετε, ἢν δ’ αὖ γένηται χυμφορά τις ἐς 
λέχος, τὰ λῷστα καὶ κάλλιστα πολεμιώτατα τίθεσθε). 
 
He exits, and the Chorus sing a hymn to Aphrodite (the goddess of sexual love – as usual in 
tragedy called Cypris for metrical reasons), primly wishing for a happy marriage.34 Ιn words 
recalling Medea’s falling for Jason, they pray that Cypris may not strike them likewise with 
desire for other beds (639: θυμὸν ἐκπλήξασ’ ἑτέροις ἐπὶ λέκτροις; cf. 8) – bed words 
occurring three times in as many lines (639: λέκτροις; 640: εὐνάς; 641: λέχη). When Medea 
is telling Aigeus about Jason leaving her, he asks whether it was because of erôs for another 
woman or because his sexual union with Medea grew hateful (697: ἐρασθεὶς ἢ σὸν ἐχθαίρων 
λέχος) – again the juxtaposition of sexual desire and lechos indicates how we should translate 
the latter. Medea replies that it was a great erôs (698: μέγαν γ’ ἔρωτα). Despite Jason’s 
avoidance of the word, Euripides makes very clear the extraordinary role of sexual passion, 
and the sex act itself, in their marriage. 
 
Medea’s womanhood, and her wifely duties for Jason, also loom large in her rhetoric. In her 
opening speech she says that everything in the world for her, as Jason himself knew, was 
embodied in one person: her husband (228-9: ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἦν μοι πάντα, γιγνώσκει καλῶς, ... 
οὑμὸς πόσις). This point is crucial. She goes on to lament the female lot (230-51): a woman 
must pay a dowry, take a husband (233: πόσιν), and provide him with sex – he becomes a 
master to her inheritance, her house and her body (233). Women must leave aside their own 
habits and customs (238), and work hard at taking on those of their husband 
(240: ξυνευνέτῃ). She says that men have life easy: the hardest thing they must do is fight in 
battle, but that is more than three times preferable to the pain of childbirth (250-1).35 
 
Having established how much wives must suffer – as women, as home-makers, and as 
mothers – Medea tells how she has suffered even more than other women as Jason’s wife. 
Unlike her audience (the Chorus of Greek women), she has nowhere else to turn: she has no 
city, no father, no friends, no mother, no brother, no relatives (252-8). This is because of all 
the things she did in her passion for Jason when she was first struck with erôs (8), before he 
took her from her home: she betrayed her father and her homeland, murdered her brother, and 
killed Jason’s uncle, Pelias (32, 483, 503, 1332).36 In forging their partnership she cut herself 
off from, and made enemies of, all those who should naturally be her philoi, and now she has 
                                                 
34 De Wet (1983) 218-19 notes that by the fourth century Aphrodite had replaced Hera as the goddess of 
marriage, and contemporaneously it was being accepted that sexual desire had an important part to play in 
marriage: ‘[Euripides] is very much at the beginning of this new thinking, openly recognizing the emotional 
needs and rights of a woman as an individual in the partnership of marriage where passionate love is 
transcending the traditional role of the wife as mistress of the home. He recognizes that not only the man but 
also the woman has emotional needs and the right to seek sexual satisfaction in marriage.’ 
35 See Goldhill (1986) 115-17 on the engagement of this speech with Athenian ideology. 
36 The murder of the brother, part of the Medea mythology (E.E. Griffiths (2006) 7), is elided by Euripides. 
nowhere to turn. In bloodily severing herself from her roles as daughter, sister, citizen and 
princess, she has made being Jason’s wife, mistress of his house, and mother of his children, 
even more formative to her self-conception than is normal in ancient Greek society.37 
Abandoned for another woman, and on the verge of having her children taken away from her, 
Medea has at a stroke lost everything in her life. Her entire self-conception is now formed by 
being a wife and a mother, and losing it all in this way creates exactly the antecedent 
situational conditions for a sexual jealousy scenario. 
 
It is for these reasons that Jason’s behaviour has been such an outrage (255-6: ὑβρίζομαι πρὸς 
ἀνδρός), and Medea feels fully justified in seeking revenge, or justice, against her husband 
(261: πόσιν δίκην τῶνδ’ ἀντιτείσασθαι κακῶν).38 She concludes her introductory speech: 
‘Whenever a woman is wronged in the marriage-bed, then no other heart is more murderous’ 
(265-6: ὅταν δ’ ἐς εὐνὴν ἠδικημένη κυρῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη φρὴν μιαιφονωτέρα). It is hard to 
overstate the importance of this statement. This is Medea speaking, not others attempting to 
understand her. To the obvious objection that Medea manipulates and deceives everyone she 
encounters in the play, I reply first that the context is one in which she is explicitly expressing 
her intention to take revenge (though the full extent of that revenge is at this stage unclear), 
and second that she does not conceal her motives from the Chorus anywhere else. There is 
therefore no reason not to take this passage seriously. Though it would be a mistake to regard 
it as the clue to her psychology, it is an important indicator of just how we should understand 
the rest of the play. In her opening speech, Medea tells us it is as a wife and woman that she 
feels wronged, and the rest of the play must be read with this in mind. ‘Jason has abandoned 
me,’ she is saying, ‘and in doing so he has hit me where it hurts most, in our marriage, in our 
bed, in our sex-life, in the thing that makes us women more murderous than any other; and I 
will take revenge on my husband.’ 
 
This revenge, then, is an organic development from Medea’s abandonment as a wife and a 
woman, in favour of another. From the beginning she says she will seek revenge, and from 
rumours that have reached Creon, this will be against him and the newly-weds (288). But 
later she conceives a worse punishment for Jason. She talks successively with three men 
(Creon, Jason and Aigeus), and each one mentions the importance of children to him. Creon 
orders Medea out the country, lest she do some evil to his daughter (282-3). He continually 
mentions how he loves his family, how his child is more dear to him than his country (327, 
329), and how much he fears for her (282, 317, 356). 
 
At this stage Medea still intends her revenge to be to kill the newly-weds and those who 
arranged the alliance (366-7), thus tying it firmly to Jason’s re-marriage, and she reconfirms 
Creon, Glauce, and Jason as her targets (374-5).39 However, repeatedly expressed concern 
with children changes her mind. In her first scene with Jason, he says his abandonment of her 
was because a new marriage would bring advantages to their children, through alliance with 
the royal family and influential brothers (549-50). Finally, Aigeus explains he is on his way 
home from Delphi, where he went for advice to relieve his childlessness (670-1). By this 
point Medea has fully grasped the importance men place on having children.40 In begging 
                                                 
37 Friedrich (1993) 227; see also Gabriel (1992) 351-2. Burnett (1998) 195 also notes that Medea’s marriage-bed 
symbolizes these three roles: Jason’s wife, mother of Jason’s genos, mistress of Jason’s oikos. 
38 I agree with Page (1938/2001) that line 262, in which Medea extends her planned revenge to Glauce and 
Creon, must for narrative reasons be an interpolation. 
39 Mastronarde (2002) 233 says she continues to maintain the illusion for the audience (and Chorus) that she 
intends to kill Jason rather than the children. I disagree: I do not believe she has yet decided to kill the children. 
40 Cf. McHardy (2008) 63. 
Aigeus’ help, she says she will cure his childlessness. With dramatic irony for her intended 
revenge, she says she will help Aigeus go from being childless (apais) to having paides – a 
journey she will first make Jason take in reverse – before mentioning her potions (717-18) – 
which, in death- rather than life-giving form, she will first use on Glauce. 
 
When Aigeus leaves the stage she spells out her revised revenge: she will use her paides to 
kill the pais of the king, and then she will kill her own children, thus destroying Jason’s entire 
(past and future) house (774-94) – something she had impotently wished for in the prologue 
(112-14), before attaining the means to bring it about.41 Jason will neither see his paides alive 
again, she says, nor have more from his newly-yoked bride (803-6). She will kill not just 
Glauce, but her own children too, as that is the best way for her husband to be hurt (817). The 
Chorus reminds us that Medea is seeking revenge for the sake of her bridal bed 
(999: νυμφιδίων ἔνεκεν λεχέων) and because her husband abandoned her to make an oikos 
with another bedfellow (1001: ἄλλᾳ ξυνοικεῖ πόσις συνεύνῳ), and this foreshadows the final 
scene. 
 
After exacting her revenge, Medea has a showdown with Jason, and once again bed words 
and Medea’s role as wife and woman recur repeatedly, with both the marriage and her 
revenge linked directly to sex. Jason says that after their marriage (1336: νυμφευθεῖσα – 
when she was a sexually-ripe νύμφη) Medea bore him children, but now has killed them 
because of sex and the marriage-bed (1338: εὐνῆς ἕκατι καὶ λέχους σφ’ ἀπώλεσας). Medea 
responds that she could not allow him to dishonour her marriage-bed (1354: σὺ δ’ οὐκ 
ἔμελλες τἄμ’ ἀτιμάσας λέχη); she killed them because of his hubris and because of his 
newly-built marriage (1366), and to bring him pain (1370) and grief (1398). Jason cannot 
believe she did all this because of his re-marriage (1367: λέχους ... οὕνεκα), but Medea says 
that such a disaster is no small thing for a woman (1368). For her that is all the answer 
needed, and takes us back to the end of her first speech, that ‘Whenever a woman is wronged 
in the marriage-bed, then no other heart is more murderous’ (265-6). 
 
Medea’s psychological affects 
 
I now turn to the emotions aroused in Medea by Jason’s betrayal. The first introduced is grief, 
and again it is the Nurse who first informs us that Medea lies in bed, not eating, surrendering 
her body to tears (24-5). Mastronarde notes that: ‘loss of appetite and inactivity, such as 
staying in bed, are signs of severe psychic turmoil (from grief or love)’.42 Medea’s grief is 
hammered home to us, as the Chorus, the Nurse, and Medea herself use a plethora of 
suffering and grieving words: cries (132, 135: βοάν); wretched (133, 149: δυστάνου/ος); 
griefs (136: ἄλγεσιν); she pines (141: τάκει); alas (146: φεῦ φεῦ); wail (149: ἀχάν); grieving 
(159: δυρομένα); I suffer (161: πάσχω); sorrow (184: πένθος); and finally, ‘I heard the loud-
groaning wail of her mourning, as she cries her wailing and wretched griefs’ (205-6: ἀχὰν 
ἄιον πολύστονον γόων, λιγυρὰ δ’ἄχεα μογερὰ βοᾷ). 
 
Two other strong emotions that Medea expresses are anger and hatred. Again from the Nurse 
we first learn that Medea’s love has turned to hatred (16: ἐχθρά). Her eyes glare bull-like 
(92), and her rage (94: χόλου) will last till she rushes down on someone (93-4).43 She is 
                                                 
41 Cf. Mastronarde (2002) 184. 
42 Mastronarde (2002) 168 – these are symptoms of betrayed erôs. 
43 The word used here, kataskêpsai, is generally used of storms or divine wrath (LSJ). 
stirring up her heart and her wrath (99: κινεῖ κραδίαν, κινεῖ δὲ χόλον),44 and the children 
should be on guard against her wild character and hating nature (102-3: φυλσσεσθ’ ἄγριον 
ἦθος στυγεράν τε φύσιν); her thumos is enlarged (108: μείζονι θυμῷ), and her spleen is hard 
to check (109: μεγαλόσπλαγχνος δυσκατάπαυστος). The Nurse says Medea will only give 
over her anger with difficulty (121: χαλεπῶς ὀργὰς μεταβάλλουσιν). The Chorus tell Medea 
not to sharpen her anger (157: μὴ χαράσσου), despite injustice from Jason and Glauce, as it is 
wearing her down; she should put aside the orgê in the depths of her thumos, and the temper 
in her breast (176-7: βαρύθυμον ὀργὰν καὶ λῆμα φρενῶν).45 
 
Creon acknowledges Medea’s thumos is roused at her husband (271: πόσει θυμουμένην). She 
will be feeling lupê (pain, distress, grief) at being robbed of her husband’s bed (286: λέκτρων 
ἀνδρὸς).46 He has heard she has made threats against the newly-weds and against himself. 
Medea dissembles: Creon has done nothing wrong, she says; it is merely her husband she 
hates (310-1: ἀλλ’ ἐμὸν πόσιν μισῶ); she does not begrudge (312: οὐ φθονῶ) Creon’s good 
fortune. Jason, after some general comments about people who feel orgê, turns specifically to 
Medea: she hates him (463: στυγεῖς), he says; Medea agrees (467: ἔχθιστος). The Chorus 
observe that orgê is terrible (520: δεινή τις ὀργὴ) whenever philoi join in strife (521: ἔριν).47 
Jason continues to refer to her anger: the great cholos in her heart (590), her orgê (615), and 
her inability to let it go (621: αὐθαδίᾳ, cf. 103-4). 
 
In all, Medea’s anger is referred to twenty-one times throughout the play (orgê: 121, 176, 
447, 520, 615, 870, 909; cholos: 94, 99, 172, 590, 898, 1266; thumos: 108, 176, 271, 865, 
879, 883, 1056, 1079), and her hatred is referred to twelve times (misos: 311; stygos: 36, 103, 
113, 463, 1374; echthos: 117, 290, 467, 1374; echthra: 16, 45). These feelings are almost 
invariably aimed at Jason, though in the prologue a few times at their children (36, 103, 113, 
117), whose presence or existence brings home what she has lost. In addition, Creon and 
Glauce are referred to on no fewer than thirteen occasions as Medea’s enemies (echthroi: 45, 
95, 278, 374, 383, 744, 750, 765, 767, 809, 897, 1050, 1060; and she theirs twice – 734, 875), 
though she does not use other hating words about them. 
 
A fourth emotion expressed regularly, if less frequently, is pride. This is behind Medea’s 
claims that Jason dishonoured her (696, 1354; the Nurse agrees: 20, 33) and that he 
committed hubris against her (255, 603, 1366).48 Her pride is further shown by her concern, 
expressed six times, that her enemies might laugh at her (383, 404, 797, 1049, 1355, 1362): 
                                                 
44 Note the active voice of kinei: this is not something that is just happening to Medea, she is actively 
perpetuating it. 
45 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30-32: orgê is a desire for revenge for an injury. Jason and Glauce committed the original 
injury, hence their action was unjust. Konstan (2006) 61-5 argues that in Trojan Women Hecuba unwillingly 
accepts the Greeks’ slaying of her daughter, since revenge is impossible; however when Polymester slays her 
son she has a means of revenge, so feels cholos. By analogy, in Medea the Chorus believe she (a foreign 
woman) must just accept the injury; revenge is out of the question, so anger is pointless; however, Medea knows 
she can take revenge, so she spurs on (99: κινεῖ) her rage. 
46 Lupê is the word Aristotle uses, in conjunction with a desire for revenge, to describe the emotion orgê 
(Rh. 2.2.1378a30: ὀργή ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας). 
47 The word eris is used repeatedly to characterize the relationship between Neoptolemos’ wife Hermione and 
his putative concubine Andromache, and the jealousy of the former for the latter, in Euripides’ Andromache 
(directly: 122, 490, 573, 960; metaphorically or indirectly: 279, 362, 467, 477, 644). 
48 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378b14-15 gives hubris as one of the three causes of orgê (see below) – Medea’s pride and 
rage are not isolated or competing motivations, but intimately bound up with each other. 
she could not bear to be an object of ridicule to them.49 The laughter of her enemies would be 
intolerable (797; cf. 383, 404), she says; no one must think her low, feeble or meek (807-8); 
rather she wants supreme kleos (810; heroic renown). It is for such reasons that Medea is 
often portrayed as acting from heroic pride, but this pride is not unconnected to her jealousy. 
She will be mocked by the people who have taken away what defined her in life: her 
husband. And it is her husband himself who first begins to mock her by belittling her feelings 
– he says she is merely chafed (555: κνίζῃ) that he left her for reasons entirely unconnected 
with her, merely irked (568: κνίζοι) by feelings of sexual inconsequentiality – reducing even 
this sexual motive to the level of a physical itch. Medea fears her enemies will not take her 
seriously, and will just laugh at and degrade her; and here Jason, the very person who should 
respect her most, is the one leading the way in belittling her. 
 
Medea’s expressed emotions – her anger, hatred, grief and wounded pride – are not just 
stand-alone, but at least some of them are also part of a jealousy complex,50 since they are 
tied up with the destruction of Medea’s marriage by Jason’s abandonment of her, by his 
forsaking of her bed and her sexual favours for the bed and favours of a rival, and (more 
generally) by his scorning and belittling her as a wife and a woman. Modern psychologists 
tell us that those who feel jealous typically talk about anger and betrayal, and try to take some 
measure of revenge. In English we do not expect a jilted woman to say ‘I am so jealous’ to 
her husband; rather she might scream ‘I can’t believe you cheated on me’, and run a nail 
down the side of his car. Medea essentially does the same, though this being Greek tragedy 
her revenge is more murderous (266: μιαιφονωτέρα). 
 
The form and extent of her revenge make us aware that a fifth emotion pervades the play, and 
this is phthonos, or begrudging envy.51 This phthonos lacks the frequent expression of the 
other four emotions, but there is a reason for this. Modern scholarship notes that envy is even 
more taboo than jealousy, and is directly claimed even less frequently.52 The taboo seems to 
have been equally present in ancient Greece: phthonos is such a damning emotion that, while 
appearing frequently in accusation, it is almost never claimed for oneself.53 Just as modern 
theory tells us that the jealousy of someone abandoned can involve envy for their rival, so it 
does for Medea. 
 
Envy’s most salient characteristic is a malicious hostility and ill-will, which drives acts of 
deep destructiveness, and it is characterized by a stronger desire for the other person not to 
enjoy something that the patient does not have, than a desire to obtain it too.54 According to 
                                                 
49 In the end she avoids her misfortunes giving her enemies pleasure, and takes pleasure in their own 
misfortunes herself (1133-5); Allan (2002) 74-5, 83-4, 93 notes that she wishes to feel Schadenfreude so they 
cannot. 
50 Contra Konstan (2003) 23-4: ‘we must allow for the possibility that where we perceive the emotion jealousy, 
the Greeks may have felt distinct sentiments, including anger, envy, sadness and emulousness, without 
assembling these several responses into a single compound’. D.L. Cairns (2008) 53-6 also disputes Konstan’s 
rejection of sexual jealousy as a motivation for Medea. NB I am not arguing that anger and pride are not genuine 
motivations for Medea in their own right – I think they are; but anger, too, can also express a socially acceptable 
aspect of a less creditable response. 
51 See Leuzinger-Bohleber (2001) 332 on Medea’s envy of Glauce. 
52 Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 321-2. For the taboo on claiming envy see also Schoeck (1966/1969) 14, Elster (1999) 164, 
R.H. Smith (1991) 85. 
53 Phthonos is claimed only twice in all surviving Archaic and Classical Greek texts, interestingly both times in 
Euripides (Bacch. 820; fr. 334.1 Kannicht). 
54 Elster (1999) 171; Wurmser and Jarass (2008a) xii; Rawls (1999) 466-7, 469; Ben-Ze’ev (2000) 283; G. 
Foster (1972) 172; Wolf (1955) 460. 
Aristotle, this is equally the case for phthonos.55 It is characteristic of envy that, due to the 
taboo nature of the emotion, it is frequently misrepresented as, or transmuted into, righteous 
indignation.56 Similarly in Greek culture, Aristotle talks about how easily phthonos can be 
confused with indignation (which he calls to nemesan).57 And this is what we see here: 
Medea talks many times about being wronged, and even more often about justice (dikê: 165, 
219, 221, 261, 265, 309, 314, 580, 582, 692, 764, 767, 802), almost from her very first 
words.58 This emotion is valid (the Nurse and Chorus agree she has been wronged – 26, 158, 
208, 267, 411, 578, 1232); but Medea’s genuine and justified indignation comes inseparably 
bound with transmuted envy.59 She has been deprived of her marriage, and is to be deprived 
likewise of her children. Begrudging envy, aroused by jealousy, ensures she will not let Jason 
keep them. It is this that drives her destructiveness against Jason’s new marriage, and against 
his children. 
 
Medea’s emotional vocabulary 
 
The Greek word normally translated as (sexual) jealousy is zêlotupia,60 but the earliest 
surviving uses of the word date from the early 380s BCE (Ar. Plut. 1016; Pl. Symp. 213d2), 
while Medea was written more than forty years earlier (431 BCE). The primary word used for 
Medea’s passion is erôs. This is more than a desire to acquire a sexual object; for instance 
Thucydides writes that the Athenians felt erôs for embarking on the conquest of Sicily (Thuc. 
6.24.3) – here it implies a desire to acquire, enjoy, and retain – though Thucydides is of 
course employing a metaphor for sexual yearning. This is certainly applicable to Medea, 
whose erôs for Jason demands exclusive possession,61 but it cannot be the whole story as, 
after her revenge and destruction of the rival, Medea is happy to end the play without 
possessing her husband. 
 
Our best evidence for ancient Greek emotions in the Classical period comes from Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric,62 but Aristotle ignores both erôs and zêlotupia. He does deal with zêlos, 
etymologically the parent emotion, but that is merely emulation for goods and qualities we do 
not possess (Arist. Rh. 2.11, 1388a32-5). Phthonos is more relevant: although it is principally 
felt when we lack something we want (English envy), it also applies when we wish to hold on 
                                                 
55 Arist. Rh. 2.9.1386b20-21: τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν 
ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν; 2.11.1388a37-38: ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον. 
56 Elster (1999) 98, 169; Parrott (1991) 5-6; Etchegoyen, Lopez and Rabih (1987) 50; R.H. Smith (2004). 
57 Arist. Rh. 2.9.1386b17: ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν. 
58 Gentili (1972) and (2000), and Giacomoni (2000) argue that Jason’s injustice is in not sharing his wife’s bed. 
Medea wants him in her bed not because she is sexually insatiable, but because that is the proper place for a 
Greek husband to be: he should be fulfilling his conjugal duties. 
59 It is possible to read Greeks rationalizing jealous revenge through the language of justice, honour and anger 
all the way back to Menelaus in the Iliad – see Bonanno (1973) on the relationship between the language of 
injustice (adikia) and the broken expectations of reciprocal amorous relationships; Pizzocaro (1994) 21-5 on 
Menelaus’ jealousy. Goldhill (2003) 167 has argued, in the context of Medea, that: ‘The language of phthonos 
(which is sometimes translated as ‘jealousy’) is linked, and subordinate, to the language of ‘honour’ (timê) and 
‘wrong’ (adikein)’. 
60 Konstan (2006) 222-32 argues against this translation in the Classical period, and I broadly agree with his 
arguments. 
61 She does not require fidelity, or at least does not say so (and indeed in Greece it would have been unusual if 
she had – see Kovacs (1980) 15-16), but she does not accept Jason having any other wife but her. 
62 Aristotle is not of course commenting specifically on Eur. Med., and his treatise was written nearly a century 
later; likewise Euripides is not a philosopher, and is not bound to be consistent in his terms as would a 
philosopher. But (as will be seen) the remarkable degree to which Aristotle’s thinking explains Medea’s 
language is a testament to how well both men understood the psychology of Greek emotions. 
to something we see as ours (English jealousy).63 This is most clearly seen when phthonos is 
directed at someone who has something we have lost (Rh. 2.10, 1388a21-22: [φθονοῦσιν] 
τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς ... ἐκέκτηντό ποτε). Aristotle is not speaking 
here of sexual jealousy, rather of possessive jealousy more generally;64 but he goes on to note 
that, among other cases, we feel phthonos most especially against our rivals in love (Rh. 2.10, 
1388a15-16: πρὸς τοὺς ... ἀντεραστὰς ..., ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν). It is clear 
therefore that Medea’s emotions can at least partly be described as phthonos. 
 
However, there are two other emotions we must consider: orgê (anger) and misos (hatred). 
Orgê, according to Aristotle, is a desire for revenge in return for a belittlement (Rh. 2.2, 
1378a30-2). It is necessary to actually perceive that you have been belittled, and similarly for 
the belittler to perceive the revenge. Aristotle mentions three types of belittlement: 
kataphronêsis, epêreasmos and hubris (1378b14-15). Kataphronêsis is contempt, showing 
you believe the other person to be of no importance (1378b15-17); epêreasmos is a 
disinterested slighting, thwarting someone’s wishes with no benefit to yourself (1378b18-20); 
hubris involves taking pleasure in shaming someone (1378b23-25) – it is an insult, an 
insolent arrogance. Medea several times says that Jason has treated her with hubris (255, 603, 
1366); she does not include Glauce and Creon – however, they are certainly included in the 
list of people who might laugh at her, behaviour Aristotle considers hubris (1379a30-32).65 It 
is also fairly clear that Jason has considered Medea of no account (i.e. he is contemptuous of 
her) in assuming he can pension her off at will, and in persistently belittling her emotions. It 
is clear then that orgê has an important part to play. 
 
Misos differs from orgê. In Greek terms, it is the emotion one feels for one’s echthroi 
(personal enemies), people who harm you without provocation. Creon is in this position: he is 
peripheral to the jealousy triangle, but has abetted Medea’s abandonment; but although he has 
harmed her, he has not belittled her – on the contrary, he wants her out the country precisely 
because he fears how formidable an echthros she might be. Medea’s feelings towards Creon 
are thus well labelled misos. 
 
Her feelings towards Glauce are best described as hostile envy, a blend of misos and 
phthonos, both of which can lead to destruction of their target. In the Greek value system, 
Medea cannot admit to phthonos, so she can but talk of her hatred. Self-presentationally, she 
avoids the charge of phthonos by lumping Glauce in with Creon as jointly ‘my echthroi’, and 
she does so frequently. Although she could potentially feel orgê for them if they were to 
mock her, this has not yet happened. The appropriate action towards one’s echthroi is to 
cause them harm – Aristotle describes misos (which he also refers to as to misein and 
echthra) as a desire to harm (Rh. 2.4, 1382a8) – and killing someone is the most harm you 
can do them. 
 
Medea’s feelings for Jason, however, are best described as a mixture of phthonos, not so 
much with misos (which, though present, is less important), but rather with orgê. Since once 
                                                 
63 On the distinctions between envy and jealousy, see Sanders (forthcoming) ch. 2, Parrott (1991) 23-7, Ben-
Ze’ev (2000) 281-2, Klein (1957/1975) 181-2, Neu (1980) 432-5. 
64 Another instance Aristotle gives where phthonos involves possessive jealousy is people who do great deeds 
and have good fortune (including those honoured for a distinction, especially wisdom or happiness), as they 
think others will try to take something away from them (Rh. 2.10, 1387b28-31). Other examples from the 
Classical period where phthonos implies possessive jealousy include: Ar. Eq. 880; Xen. Mem. 4.2.33.11; Pl. 
Leg. 730e5, Spur. 376d5, Spur. 376d8; Isoc. 4.29.4. 
65 She also believes Glauce and Creon would treat her children with hubris if she left them behind (782), and the 
Corinthians would too after the children were made complicit in the royal deaths (1061, 1380). 
again Greek cultural taboos ensure that phthonos cannot be admitted, all that is left for Medea 
to talk about is her response to her belittlement and her injury by Jason: her orgê. David 
Konstan argues that: 
 
 The object of anger … is to cause pain to the other. A slight makes one feel small, and 
the only way to get even is to induce a similar feeling in the other. It follows that, for 
an angry person to get revenge, the original offender must be aware of it (aisthesthai), 
since there is no such thing as unperceived pain (hence the stipulation in the definition 
of anger that the revenge, like the slight itself, must be perceived), whereas to one 
who hates it is a matter of indifference whether an enemy is aware or not of the 
damage done to him. That is why we may wish that people whom we hate should die, 
but when we are angry, what we desire is that the other person feel in return 
(antipathein) the kind of diminishment that provoked our anger in the first place 
(2.4, 1382a14-15). The death of the other would render that impossible.66 
 
Creon and Glauce wantonly inflicted harm on Medea; it is for this reason she wants them 
dead. At first, she believes this is what she wants for Jason too (hence misos is present); 
however, as she reflects, she realizes that is not sufficient punishment: his was not the 
injuring of an echthros, but a deeply painful belittling; her anger is stronger than her hatred, 
and accordingly Jason must remain alive to perceive her revenge. This is why Medea, having 
determined that her revenge will be to kill Jason alongside Creon and Glauce (373-5), 
eventually changes her mind: Creon and Glauce will still die, but Jason must be left alive to 
know that his children are dead because of his treatment of Medea (774-96). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Sexual jealousy has suffered in the interpretation of this play partly because, like phthonos, 
its expression was taboo to the Greeks, but partly also because it does not have a convenient 
prototypical label in Greek, such as our word jealousy. The scenario was familiar to the 
Greeks – in this play, the Nurse, the Tutor, the Chorus of Corinthian Women, and Jason all 
recognize it, even if Medea does not,67 and the inference must be that the audience recognize 
it too.68 However, labelling the emotion is more difficult. Semantically, it appears that sexual 
jealousy falls somewhere between erôs, phthonos, misos, and orgê.69 We can also note that 
Medea emphasizes certain elements of the jealousy prototype more than we might expect 
from modern psychological research, especially the blow to her pride (the hubris and the 
potential mocking laughter), her rage and her hatred. It is possible that the status-conscious 
                                                 
66 Konstan (2006) 47. 
67 Cf. D.L. Cairns (2008) 55. Parrott (1991) 6 notes: ‘it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or 
jealous person is the last person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions’. 
68 The scenario of rival for legitimate wife also occurs in Soph. Trach. and Eur. Andr., and many aspects of 
Medea’s sexual jealousy scenario recur in all three plays: legitimate wives (actually or potentially) abandoned 
for a rival; roles as Greek wife (home-keeper, bedmate, bearer of legitimate children) threatened; erôs felt for 
partner; concern about exclusivity of position; concern with status, that the rival can give the husband something 
they cannot (Medea, power and status; Iole, youth and sexual allure; Andromache, male offspring); rival living 
under wife’s roof, or husband abandoning his oikos for the rival’s; anger felt for husband; hostility (albeit mild 
for Deianira) and phthonos felt for rival; distinctly expressed desire to beat rival – see Sanders (forthcoming) 
ch.8 for a detailed discussion of these other tragedies, as well as a survey of, and comparison with, male 
jealousy in oratory and comedy. 
69 D.L. Cairns (2008) 56 argues, with somewhat different emphasis, that Medea’s sexual jealousy is part of her 
orgê: ‘the fact that anger at insult and injustice does not invariably encompass jealousy does not mean that it 
may not’ – cf. his similar earlier comment regarding jealousy in English: ‘Anger at a partner who prefers 
someone else is a perfectly good way of referring to the prototypical scenario of ‘jealousy’’ (54). 
Greeks were more sensitive to these aspects of the jealousy complex than we,70 and therefore 
their vocabulary was better adapted to express these, rather than the complex as a whole. 
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